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Abstract
The proliferation of real-time applications has spurred much interest in data freshness, captured
by the age-of-information (AoI) metric. When strategic data sources have private market information,
a fundamental economic challenge is how to incentivize them to acquire fresh data and optimize the
age-related performance. In this work, we consider an information update system in which a destination
acquires, and pays for, fresh data updates from multiple sources. The destination incurs an age-related
cost, modeled as a general increasing function of the AoI. Each source is strategic and incurs a sampling
cost, which is its private information and may not be truthfully reported to the destination. The destination
decides on the price of updates, when to get them, and who should generate them, based on the sources’
reported sampling costs. We show that a benchmark that naively trusts the sources’ reports can lead to
an arbitrarily bad outcome compared to the case where sources truthfully report. To tackle this issue,
we design an optimal (economic) mechanism for timely information acquisition following Myerson’s
seminal work. The nature of AoI requires a new design of the optimal mechanism. To this end, our
proposed optimal mechanism minimizes the sum of the destination’s age-related cost and its payment to
the sources, while ensuring that the sources truthfully report their private information and will voluntarily
participate in the mechanism. We further propose a quantized version of the optimal mechanism that
achieves approximate optimality, maintains the other economic properties, and enables one to tradeoff
between optimality and computational overheads. Our analytical and numerical studies show that (i)
the optimal mechanism can lead to an unbounded benefit under some distributions of the source costs
compared against a benchmark; (ii) the optimal mechanism is most beneficial when there are few sources
with heterogeneous sampling costs.
M. Zhang, E. Wei, and Randall A. Berry are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Northwestern Uni-
versity, Evanston, IL 60208 (e-mail: meng.zhang@northwestern.edu; ermin.wei@northwestern.edu; rberry@northwestern.edu).
A. Arafa is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte,
NC 28223 (e-mail: aarafa@uncc.edu).
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
15
75
1v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 29
 Ju
n 2
02
0
2I. INTRODUCTION
The rapidly growing number of mobile devices and the dramatic increase in real-time applica-
tions has driven interest in fresh data as measured by the age-of-information (AoI) [1]. Real-time
applications in which fresh data is critical include real-time monitoring, data analytics, vehicular
networks, and cloud computing frameworks. For example, real-time knowledge of traffic infor-
mation and the speed of motor vehicles is crucial in autonomous driving and unmanned aerial
vehicles. Another example is real-time mobile crowd-sensing (or mobile crowd-learning [2])
applications, in which a platform is fueled by mobile users’ participatory contribution of real-
time data. This class of examples includes real-time traffic congestion and accident information
on Google Waze [3] and real-time location information for scattered commodities and resources
(e.g., GasBuddy [4]).
Keeping data fresh relies on frequent data generation, processing, and sampling, which can
lead to significant (sampling) costs for the data source. In practice, data sources (i.e., fresh data
contributors) are self-interested in the sense that they may have their own interests different from
those of data destinations (i.e., fresh data requestors). Consequently, the participation of sources
relies on proper incentives from the destination. The resulting economic interactions between
sources and destinations constitute fresh data markets, which have been studied in [2], [5]–[7].
The existing studies on fresh data markets [2], [5]–[7] designed incentives assuming complete
information. A crucial economic challenge not addressed in these works is dealing with market
information asymmetry. Specifically, sources in practice may have private (market) information
(e.g., sampling cost and data freshness) that is unknown by others. Therefore, they may manipu-
late the outcome of the system (e.g., their subsidies and the scheduling policies) by misreporting
such private information to their own advantages. To the best of our knowledge, no existing
work has addressed fresh data markets with such asymmetric information. Motivated by the
above issue, this work aims to solve the following key question:
Question 1. How should a destination acquire fresh data with self-interested sources and market
information asymmetry?
A. Challenges and Solution Approach
Existing related studies on information asymmetry in data markets (without considering data
freshness) have identified two different levels of possible manipulation [8]–[13], depending on
3whether data is verifiable, i.e., whether the destination can verify the authenticity (or freshness)
of data. These two levels of manipulation are:
1) Market information misreporting. For verifiable data, a source may benefit from misre-
porting its cost and quality information (as in, e.g. [8]–[12]).
2) Data fraud. For unverifiable data, a source may even fake the data itself, e.g., by sending
dummy data to avoid incurring corresponding costs (as in, e.g., [13]).
As a first step towards tackling a fresh data market with asymmetric information, this work
focuses on the first type of manipulation due to misreporting private cost information and assumes
verifiable fresh data. Even this level of misreporting is challenging and may lead to an arbitrarily
bad loss, as we will analytically show in Section III-D.
In the economics literature, a standard approach for designing markets with asymmetric
information is via the optimal mechanism design approach of Myerson [22]. Nevertheless,
our fresh data market framework further introduces two main challenges such that existing
mechanisms cannot be directly applied. First, existing mechanisms are designed for different
problem settings while the nature of AoI requires new design of optimal mechanisms and
proper problem formulations. Second, the optimal mechanisms may suffer from unaffordable
computational overheads as it involves solving an infinite dimensional optimization problem. On
the other hand, under the classical settings, the optimal mechanisms exhibit the low-complexity
structure of “auctions”, which is not the case here.
To this end, we leverage the optimal mechanism design approach to optimize an AoI-related
performance and address the following questions:
Question 2. How beneficial is the optimal mechanism compared with a naive mechanism that
assumes a data source’s reports are truthful?
Question 3. How should a destination design a computation-efficient and optimal mechanism
for acquiring fresh data?
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• Fresh Data Market Modeling with Private Cost Information. We develop a new analytical
model for a fresh data market with private cost information and allow multiple sources to
strategically misreport this information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
in the AoI literature to address market information asymmetry.
4• Optimal Mechanism Design. Based on Myerson’s seminal work, we transform the optimal
mechanism design problem into an infinite-dimensional convex optimization problem. We
then solve the problem and analytically derive the optimal and solution.
• Quantized Mechanism Design. To further reduce computational overheads, we design a
quantized approximation of the optimal mechanism while maintaining the sources’ truth-
fulness. This achieves approximate optimality and enables one to make tradeoffs between
optimality and computational overhead by tuning the quantization step size.
• Performance Comparison. Our analytical and numerical results show that when the sampling
cost is exponentially distributed, the performance gains of our optimal mechanism can be
unbounded compared against a benchmark mechanism. In addition, the optimal mechanism
is most beneficial when there are fewer sources with more heterogeneous sampling costs.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. In Section II, we discuss some related work.
In Section III, we describe the system model and the mechanism design problem formulation.
In Sections IV and V, we develop the optimal mechanisms for single-source systems and multi-
source systems, respectively. In Section VI, we develop the quantized mechanism. Section VII,
studies the optimal mechanism design under general virtual cost functions, which will be defined
in Sections IV and V. We provide some analytical and numerical results in Section VIII to
evaluate the performances of the optimal mechanism and the quantized mechanism, and we
conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Age-of-Information: The AoI metric has been introduced and analyzed in various contexts in
the recent years (e.g., [1], [14]–[21]). Of particular relevance to this work are those pertaining
to the economics of fresh data and information [2], [5]–[7]. The most closely-related studies to
ours are in [2], [6], which consider systems with destinations using dynamic pricing schemes
to incentivize sensors to provide fresh updates. The sources in [2], [6] are myopic instead of
forward-looking, i.e., in our case the source considers its longer term payoff. None of this prior
work has considered the role of private market information as we do here.
Optimal Mechanism Design: There exists a rich economics literature on optimal mechanism
design (e.g. [22]–[27]). Our approach is based on Myerson’s characterization of incentive compat-
ibility and optimal mechanism design [22]. A closely related line of work is optimal procurement
mechanism design (e.g. [23]–[27]), in which a buyer designs a mechanism for purchasing
5items from multiple suppliers and revealing their private quality information. However, existing
mechanisms cannot be directly applied here due to differences in the problem setting (linear
programming in [23]–[26] and combinatorial optimization in [27]).
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Another closely related direction is approx-
imately optimal mechanism design (e.g. [33]–[38] and surveys in [31], [32]). In particular,
approximate mechanisms have been proposed to deal with a wide range of practical issues such
as bounded communication overheads (e.g. [37], [38]), bounded computational overheads (e.g.
[34]–[36]), and limited distributional knowledge (e.g. [33]). Our quantized mechanism aims
at reducing computational overheads due to the underlaying infinite-dimensional optimization
problem; references [34]–[36] mainly proposed combinatorial auctions to reduce computational
overheads for combinatorial problems, which is not the case here.
Information Acquisition: There has been a recent line of work on viewing data as an
economic good. A growing amount of attention has been placed on understanding the interactions
between the strategic nature of data holders and the statistical inference and learning tasks that
use data collected from these holders (e.g. [8]–[13]). In this line of research, a data collector
designs mechanisms with payments to incentivize data holders to reveal data, under private
information. However, none of the studies in this line of research considered data freshness.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider an information update system in which a set I = {1 ≤ i ≤ I} of data sources
(such as Internet-of-Things devices) generate data packets and send them to one destination.
1) Data Updates and Scheduling: We consider a generate-at-will model (as in, e.g., [15],
[19]), in which the sources are able to generate and send a new update when requested by the
destination. We assume instant update arrivals at the destination, with negligible transmission
delay (as in, e.g. [19]).
The destination’s data acquisition policy consists of two decision sets, namely and the update
policy X and the (source) scheduling policy S. In particular, the update policy requested by the
destination determines a sequence of times to request updates given by X , {xk}k∈N, where
every xk ≥ 0 denotes the interarrival time between the (k−1)-th and k-th updates. The scheduling
policy S , {si,k}i∈I,k∈N is a set of binary indicators specifying which source is to be selected to
6generate the k-th update. That is, si,k = 1 indicates that source i is selected for the k-th update
and si,k = 0 indicates otherwise. The scheduling policy S should satisfy∑
i∈I
si,k = 1, ∀k ∈ N, (1a)
si,k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ N, i ∈ I, (1b)
i.e., at each update, exactly one source is to be selected.
Let yi,κ denote the interarrival time between κ-th and (κ− 1)-th updates generated by source
i. Mathematically,
yi,κ =
j(i,κ)∑
k=j(i,κ−1)+1
xk,∀i ∈ I, κ ∈ N, (2)
where j(i, κ) indicates that the j(i, κ)-th update received by the destination is the κ-th update
generated by source i, i.e.,
∑j(i,κ)
k=1 si,k = κ and
∑j(i,κ)−1
k=1 si,k = κ− 1 for all i ∈ I and κ ∈ N.
Each source i’s data updates are subject to a maximal update frequency constraint (as in [15]),
given by
lim sup
K→∞
∑K
κ=1 yi,κ
K
≥ 1
fi,max
, ∀i ∈ I. (3)
where fi,max is the maximal allowed average update frequency for source i, which could reflect
constraints on the resources available to this source (e.g. CPU power).
2) Age-of-Information: The Age-of-Information (AoI) at time t is defined as [1]
∆t(X ) = t− Ut, (4)
where Ut is time stamp of the most recently received update before time t, i.e.,
Ut = max
k∈N
k∑
j=1
xj s.t.
k∑
j=1
xj ≤ t, ∀i ∈ I.
3) Source’s Sampling Cost and Private Information: We denote the source i’s unit sampling
cost by ci for each update, which is its private information. We consider a Bayesian setting
in which each source i’s sampling cost is drawn from Ci = [ci, c¯i]. We define C = {Ci}i∈I .
Let Γi(ci) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and γi(ci) be the probability density
function (PDF) for source i; we assume that only source i’s prior distribution is known by the
destination and sources other than i.1
1In the case where such distributional knowledge is unavailable, one can further consider prior-free approximately optimal
mechanism design, as in [33], which will be left for future work.
74) Destination’s AoI Cost: We introduce an AoI cost function g(∆t(X )) to represent the level
of dissatisfaction for data staleness for the destination. We model it as a general non-negative
and increasing function in ∆t(X ). We can specify the AoI cost function based on applications.
For instance, in online learning (advertisement placement and online web ranking [28], [29]),
one can use g(∆t(X )) = ∆αt with α ≥ 0.
We further define the destination’s cumulative AoI cost as
G(x) ,
∫ x
0
g(∆t)d∆t, (5)
which denotes the aggregate cost for an interarrival time x. Note that G(x) is convex in x since
G′′(x) = g′(x) > 0.
B. Mechanism Design and Reporting Game
The destination designs an (economic) mechanism for acquiring sources’ report of its sampling
cost and data updates. The sources’ report profile of their sampling costs is c˜ , {c˜i}i∈I , where
c˜i denotes source i’s report. A mechanism takes the sources’ reports (potential misreports) of
their sampling costs as the input of the data acquisition policy, and the monetary reward to each
source. Mathematically, a general mechanism m = (P ,X ,S) is a tuple of a payment rule P , an
update policy X , and a scheduling policy S. The prices (i.e., rewards) can be different across
different updates and sources. That is, P , {pi,k}i∈I,k∈N, where pi,k : I × C → R+. The sets
X and S are defined in Section III-A1. Functions P , X , and S are functions of the sources’
reported costs c˜ , {c˜i}i∈I .
1) Reporting Game in Multi-Source Systems: When there are multiple sources (i.e., I ≥ 2),
the mechanism m induces game interactions among sources, namely a reporting game:
Game 1 (Reporting Game). The reporting game G is a tuple given by G = (I, {Ci}i∈I , {Pi}i∈I),
defined as:
• Players: the set of all sources I;
• Strategy space: each source i’s reporting strategy is c˜i ∈ Ci;
• Payoff: each source i has a payoff function:2
Pi (c˜i, c˜−i|m, ci) = lim inf
K→∞
∑K
k=1 si,k(c˜)(pi,k(c˜)− ci)∑K
k=1 xk(c˜)
, ∀i ∈ I. (6)
2The infimum limit in (6) implies that each source is concerned about its worse-case scenario of its payoff.
8Note that, in related studies [2], [6], the considered sources are not forward-looking. Instead,
they are assumed myopic, i.e., not maximizing their respective long-term objectives as in (6).
Since each source i does not know the other sources’ exact sampling costs c−i but only knows
the corresponding prior distributions, a Bayesian equilibrium is induced defined as [30]:
Definition 1 (Bayesian Equilibrium). The Bayesian equilibrium is the sources’ reporting profile
c˜∗(m|c) = {c˜∗i (m|ci)}i∈I such that, for all i ∈ I,
Ec−i [Pi
(
c˜∗i (m|ci), c˜∗−i(m|c−i)|m, ci
)
] ≥ Ec−i [Pi
(
c˜i, c˜
∗
−i(m|c−i)|m, ci
)
], ∀c˜i ∈ Ci, (7)
where c˜∗−i(m|c−i) = {c˜∗j(m|cj)}j 6=i.
In other words, the Bayesian equilibrium depicts a strategy profile where each player maxi-
mizes its expected payoff assuming the strategy of the other players is fixed.
The destination aims to design an optimal mechanism to minimize its expected (long-term
time average) overall cost:
J(m) = Ec
[
lim sup
K→∞
∑K
k=1[G (xk(c˜
∗(m|c))) +∑i∈I si,k (c˜∗(m|c)) pi,k (c˜∗(m|c))]∑K
k=1 xk(c˜
∗(m|c))
]
, (8)
where c˜∗(m|c) is the Bayesian equilibrium defined in (7).
Each source i may have incentive to misreport its private information c˜i. However, according
to the revelation principle [22], for any mechanism m, there exists an incentive compatible (i.e.
truthful) equivalence m˜, such that J(m) = J(m˜). This allows us to replace all c˜∗(m|c) in (8) by
c, restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms, and impose the following incentive
compatibility constraint:
IC : ci ∈ arg max
c˜i∈Ci
Ec−i [Pi (c˜i, c−i|m, ci)],∀i ∈ I. (9)
Furthermore, a mechanism should further satisfy the following (interim) individual rationality
(IR) constraint:
IR : max
c˜i∈Ci
Ec−i [Pi
(
c˜i, c˜
∗
−i(m|c−i)|m, ci
)
] ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I. (10)
That is, each source should not receive a negative expected payoff; otherwise, it may choose not
to participate in the mechanism.
92) Single-Source System: We now discuss a special case where there is only one source and
hence we can drop the index i and there exists no game-theoretic interaction among sources.
The incentive compatibility and the individual rationality constraints are then reduced to:
IC− S : c ∈ arg max
c˜∈C
P (c˜|m, c) , (11)
IR− S : max
c˜∈C
P (c˜|m, c) ≥ 0. (12)
C. Problem Formulation
The destination seeks to find a mechanism m to minimize its overall cost:
min
m
J(m) (13a)
s.t. (1), (3), IC in (9) (or (11)) and IR in (10) (or (12)). (13b)
This is potentially a challenging optimization problem as the space of all mechanisms is infinite
dimensional and further the constraints in (9) and (10) are non-trivial.
We will now show that a special, simplified, class of m satisfying (9) and (10) is optimal.
Definition 2 (Equal-Spacing and Flat-Rate Mechanism). A mechanism m = (P ,X ,S) is equal-
spacing and flat-rate if
pi,k(·) = pi(·) and xk(·) = x(·) ,∀k ∈ N, i ∈ I, (14)
for some functions pi : C → R+ and x : C → R+.
Definition 3 ((Randomized) Stationary Scheduling). The scheduling policy S is said to be
stationary if, for all i ∈ I, we have that given any c, si,k(c) is chosen randomly at each
time k and is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) across k and satisfies
Pr(si,k(c˜) = 1) = pii(c˜), ∀c˜ ∈ C, k ∈ N, i ∈ I. (15)
for some functions pii : C → [0, 1].
The stationary scheduling policies defined above are memoryless, in the sense that si,k are
independent across time. We now introduce the following lemma which shows that the existence
of optimal mechanisms with these properties:
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Lemma 1. There exists an optimal mechanism m∗ = (P∗,X ∗,S∗) that is (i) equal-spacing
and flat-rate, satisfying Definition 2, and (ii) its scheduling policy S∗ is stationary, satisfying
Definition 3.
We present the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A. The proof of Lemma 1 involves showing
that, for any optimal mechanism m∗, we can always construct an equal-spacing and flat-rate
mechanism with a stationary scheduling policy that yields at most the same objective value.
This is mainly done by leveraging the convexity of G(·). Lemma 1 allows us to restrict us
attention to simple mechanisms so that we can now
• drop the index k in pi,k and xk;
• generate si,k according to some i.i.d. distributions (across k) characterized by pii as in (15).
Therefore, we next use the notation: m = (p, x,pi) where p is the payment profile, i.e.,
p , {pi}i∈I , and pi is the probability profile, i.e., pi , {pii}i∈I . It follows that, under an equal-
spacing and flat-rate mechanism with a stationary scheduling policy, each source i’s payoff in
(6) becomes:
Pi (c˜i, c˜−i|m, ci) = pii(c˜)(pi(c˜)− ci)
x(c˜)
, ∀i ∈ I, (16)
and the destination’s overall cost in (8) becomes:
J(m) = Ec
[
G (x(c˜∗(m|c))) +∑i∈I pii (c˜∗(m|c)) pi (c˜∗(m|c))
x(c˜∗(m|c))
]
. (17)
That is, we can drop the infimum/supremum limits in (6) and (8).
D. Naive Mechanism
In this subsection, we introduce a naive mechanism that satisfies Definition 2 for single-source
systems. We use this to show that such a mechanism can lead to an arbitrarily large cost for the
destination when g(x) = xα, α > 0.
Example 1 (Naive Mechanism). The destination subsidizes the source’s reported cost; the update
policy rule xN(c˜) aims at minimizing its overall cost in (8), naively assuming the source’s report
is truthful:
pN(c˜) =c˜, (18a)
xN(c˜) = arg min
x≥0
xα+1/(α + 1) + pN(c˜)
x
. (18b)
Solving (18b) further gives
xN(c˜) =
[(
1 +
1
α
)
· c˜
] 1
1+α
. (19)
Given this naive mechanism, the source solves the following reporting problem:
c˜∗ = arg max
c˜∈C
c˜− c[(
1 + 1
α
) · c˜]1/(1+α) , (20)
whose solution can be shown given by c˜∗ = c¯, i.e., the optimal reporting strategy is to report
the maximal possible value. This makes the destination’s overall cost to be given by[
c¯
(
1 +
1
α
)] α
1+α
. (21)
Note that the ratio of the destination’s objectives in (21) under the source’s optimal report and
the true cost is
(
c¯
c
) α
1+α , which can be arbitrarily large as c¯ approaches infinity. Misreports leading
to an arbitrarily large cost to the destination motivates the optimal mechanism design in the next
section.
IV. SINGLE-SOURCE OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section, we start with a system with only one source. Therefore, we can drop the index
i in our notations. We use the results of Lemma 1 to reformulate (13) and characterize the IC
and the IR constraints in (11) and (12). The optimal mechanism design problem is then reduced
to an infinite-dimensional optimization problem, which we analytically solve and use to derive
useful insights.
A. Problem Reformulation
Lemma 1 allows us to focus on the equal-spacing and flat-rate mechanism. The scheduling
indicators satisfy si(c˜) = 1 since the only source will be selected for each update. For nota-
tion simplification, we drop the scheduling indicators S so that the equal-spacing and flat-rate
mechanism is reduced to m = (p, x).
To further facilitate our analysis, we use f(c˜) to denote the update rate rule and h(c˜) to denote
the payment rate rule such that
h(c˜) , p(c˜)
x(c˜)
and f(c˜) , 1
x(c˜)
, ∀c˜ ∈ C. (22)
Since (22) defines an one-to-one mapping between (p, x) and (f, h), we can focus on m = (f, h)
in the following and then derive the optimal (p∗, x∗) based on the optimal (f ∗, h∗).
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Illustration of IC and IR under a mechanism satisfying (23) and (24): The source’s payoff comparison between (a) a
truthful report (c˜ = c) and (b) an over-report (c˜ > c).
B. Characterization of IC and IR
1) Incentive Compatibility: We can characterize the IC constraint in (9) based on Myerson’s
work [22].
Theorem 1. A mechanism m = (f, h) is incentive compatible if and only if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
1) f(c) is non-increasing in c ∈ C;
2) h(c) has the following form:
h(c) = c · f(c)−
∫ c
c
f(z)dz + C, (23)
for some constant C ∈ R with respect to c (but may depend on f(c)).
We present the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix B.
2) Individual Rationality: Given an arbitrary incentive compatible mechanism satisfying (23),
to further satisfy the IR constraint in (10), we have that the minimal C for the incentive
compatible mechanism in Theorem in 1 is
C =
∫ c¯
c
f(z)dz. (24)
We present an example in Fig. 1 to illustrate (23) and (24). Under a non-increasing f(·) and
h(·) satisfying (23) and (24), a truthfully reporting source receives a payoff of ∫ c¯
c
f(t)dt, as
shown in Fig. 1 (a); when the source reports c˜, its payoff is (c˜− c)f(c˜) + ∫ c¯
c˜
f(t)dt. As shown
in Fig. 1 (b), such an over-report incurs a payoff loss. Similarly, an under-report would also
incur a payoff loss. These demonstrate incentive compatibility. In addition, the source’s payoff
13
is always non-negative for any c. In addition, its payoff approaches 0 when c approaches c¯, as
limc→c¯
∫ c¯
c
f(z)dz = 0. This demonstrates individual rationality.
C. Mechanism Optimization Problem
Based on (24) and (23), we can focus on optimizing the update rate function f(c) only in the
following. Since
∫ c¯
c
|f(c)|2dΓ(c) < +∞, the update rate function f(·) lives in the Hilbert space
L2(Γ) associated to the measure of c, i.e. the CDF Γ(c).
By Theorem 1 and (24), we transform the destination’s problem into
min
f(·)
J(f) , Ec
[
G
(
1
f(c)
)
f(c) + c · f(c) +
∫ c¯
c
f(z)dz
]
(25a)
s.t. f(·) ∈ F , {f(·) : f(c) ∈ [0, fmax], f ′(c) ≤ 0, ∀c ∈ C} . (25b)
In particular, the objective (25a) comes from (24) and (23), the constraint f ′(c) ≤ 0 comes from
Theorem 1 and f(c) ∈ [0, fmax] comes from (3).
This is a functional optimization problem. To derive insightful results, we first relax the
constraint in (25b) and then show when such a relaxation in fact leads to a feasible solution
f ∗(·) (i.e., when it automatically satisfies (25b)).
We introduce the definition of the source’s virtual cost analog to the standard definition of
virtual value in [22]:
Definition 4 (Virtual Cost). The source’s virtual cost is
φ(c) , c+ Γ(c)
γ(c)
. (26)
The virtual cost allows us to transform the destination’s problem, as we will show in the
following lemma:
Lemma 2. The objective in (25a) can be rewritten as
J(f) = Ec
[
G
(
1
f(c)
)
f(c) + f(c)φ(c)
]
, (27)
Proof: Eq. (27) follows directly from
Ec
[∫ c¯
c
f(z)dz
]
=
∫ c¯
c
(∫ c¯
t
f(z)dz
)
γ(t)dt, (28)
(a)
=
∫ c¯
c
(∫ z
c
γ(t)dt
)
f(z)dz = Ec [f(c)φ(c)] , (29)
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where (a) involves changing the order of integration.
To solve (25), we introduce the Gaˆteaux derivative (analog to sub-gradient in finite dimensional
space) of a functional h in the direction of w ∈ L2(Γ) at f ∈ L2(Γ) [39]:
dh(f ;w) , lim
→0+
h(f + w)− h(f)

. (30)
The Gaˆteaux derivative of the objective in (25) w.r.t. f in the direction of w is:
dJ(f ;w)=Ec
[
w(c)
(
G
(
1
f(c)
)
− g
(
1
f(c)
)
1
f(c)
+ φ(c)
)]
. (31)
According to [39], [40], if we relax the constraint in (25b), f(c) is an optimal solution if and
only if
dJ(f ;w) ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ L2(Γ). (32)
Consider the Dirac delta function δ(x) ∈ L2(Γ) (∫∞−∞ δ(x)dx = 1 and δ(x) = 0 for all x 6= 0).
Substituting w(x) = δ(x − c) for each c ∈ C into (60), it follows that the optimality condition
of (25) when relaxing the constraint in (25b) can be rewritten as
f ∗(c) = min
{
fi,max, fˆ(c)
}
, ∀c ∈ C, (33)
where fˆ(·) satisfies
g
(
1
fˆ(c)
)
1
fˆ(c)
−G
(
1
fˆ(c)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal AoI Cost Reduction
= φ(c)︸︷︷︸
Virtual Cost
, ∀c ∈ C. (34)
To comprehend above results, (33) and (34) imply that the optimization problem in (25) is in
fact separable across all c, and each decomposed problem is for a given c. The optimal solution
f ∗(c) solves each decomposed problem by the following two steps: (i) search for a fˆ(c) that
equalizes the marginal AoI cost reduction and the virtual cost φ(c) for every c ∈ C; (ii) project
every fˆ(c) onto the feasible set [0, fi,max].
To see when (33) yields a feasible solution satisfying (25b), note that there always exists a
unique positive value of fˆ(c) in (34) hence the optimal f ∗(c) for each c in (33). In addition, if
φ(c) is non-decreasing in c, f ∗(c) is non-increasing in c.3 To summarize:
Theorem 2. If φ(c) is non-decreasing, the optimal mechanism m∗ = (f ∗, h∗) satisfies (33), (23),
and (24).
3The condition of the virtual cost φ(c) being non-decreasing is known as the regularity condition in [22].
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A non-decreasing virtual cost is in fact satisfied for a wide range of distributions of the
source’s sampling cost. We will focus on such specific distributions in Section VIII and generalize
Theorem 2 to the more general (potentially not monotonic) virtual cost case in Section VII.
On the other hand, we remark that the computation of the optimal payment rate h∗(c) requires
to solve f ∗(c) in (33) over the entire interval [c, c¯], which may be computationally impractical.
This motivates us to consider a computation-efficient approximation of the optimal mechanism
m∗ = (f ∗, h∗) in Section VI.
V. MULTI-SOURCE OPTIMAL MECHANISM
In this section, we extend our results in Section IV to multi-source systems. The additional
challenge here is that the optimal mechanism needs to take the sources’ interactions with each
other into account. Similar to the single-source case, we first characterize the IC and the IR
constraints, and then solve the infinite-dimensional optimization problem.
A. Problem Reformulation
Lemma 1 allows us to focus on equal-spacing and flat-rate mechanisms with stationary schedul-
ing policies (i.e., m = (p, x,pi)). To further facilitate our analysis, we use f(c˜) = {fi(c˜)}i∈I to
denote the update rate rule and h(c˜) = {hi(c˜)}i∈I to denote the payment rate rule such that,
for all i ∈ I and all c˜ ∈ C:
hi(c˜) ,
pii(c˜) · pi(c˜)
x(c˜)
, fi(c˜) ,
pii(c˜)
x(c˜)
, (35a)
pii(c˜) =
fi(c˜)∑
j∈I fj(c˜)
. (35b)
The above equations (35) defines an one-to-one mapping between (p, x,pi) and (f ,h). Hence, we
can restrict our attention to m = (f ,h) in the following and then derive the optimal (p∗, x∗,pi∗).
We can then generate the corresponding stationary scheduling policy S∗ satisfying (35b) based
on the optimal (f ∗,h∗).
B. Characterization of Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
1) Incentive Compatibility: Theorem 1 can be generalized as follows to the multi-source
setting to characterize the IC constraint in (9):
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Theorem 3. A mechanism m = (f ,h) is incentive compatible if and only if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
1) fi(ci, c−i) is non-increasing in ci ∈ Ci;
2) hi(ci, c−i) has the following form:
hi(c) = ci · fi(c)−
∫ ci
ci
fi(z, c−i)dz + Ci, ∀i ∈ I, (36)
for some constant Ci ∈ R.
We present the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix B.
2) Individual Rationality: Given an arbitrary incentive compatible mechanism satisfying (36),
to further satisfy the IR constraint in (10), we have that the minimal Ci for the incentive
compatible mechanism in Theorem 3 is
Ci =
∫ c¯i
ci
fi(z, c−i)dz, ∀i ∈ I. (37)
C. Mechanism Optimization Problem
Based on (36) and (37), we can focus on optimizing the update rate function f(c) only what
follows, which live in the Hilbert space L2(Γ) associated to the measure of c. We introduce the
definition of the source i’s virtual cost.
Definition 5 (Virtual Cost). The source i’s virtual cost is
φi(ci) , ci +
Γi(ci)
γi(ci)
, ∀i ∈ I. (38)
The sources’ virtual costs enable the proper problem transformation, as we will show in the
following lemma:
Lemma 3. The destination’s problem in (13) is equivalent to
min
f(·)
J(f) , Ec
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I fi(c)
)∑
i∈I
fi(c) +
∑
i∈I
φi(ci)fi(c)
]
(39a)
s.t. f(·) ∈ F , {f(·) : fi(c) ∈ [0, fi,max], f ′i(c) ≤ 0, ∀c ∈ C, i ∈ I} . (39b)
The proof of Lemma 3 involves changing the order of integration. Different from (25), the
functional optimization problem in (39) has a vector function as its optimization decision. To
derive insightful results, we first omit the f ′i(c) ≤ 0 constraints for all i ∈ I, similar to our
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approach in Section IV. Such constraints are automatically satisfied assuming the virtual costs
are non-decreasing φi(ci) as we will show later. We will extend our results to the case of general
virtual costs in Section VII.
To solve the problem in (39), we next introduce the aggregate update rate rule:
fagg(c) =
∑
i∈I
fi(c), ∀c ∈ C, (40)
and the following definition:
Definition 6 (Aggregate Virtual Cost). Let Ψ(c, fagg(c)) be the aggregate virtual cost function,
defined as
Ψ(c, fagg(c)) = min
f
∑
i∈I
φi(ci)fi(c) (41a)
s.t. (40), fi(c) ∈ [0, fi,max],∀i ∈ I. (41b)
The definition of the aggregate virtual cost in Definition 6 involves solving an infinite-
dimensional linear programming problem. The intuition of solving (41) is as follows. Given
each c and fagg(c), we assign the sources with higher virtual costs only after the sources with
lower virtual costs φi(ci) are fully utilized (i.e., the constraints in (41b) are binding). It is readily
verified that, given c, Ψ(c, fagg(c)) is a piece-wise linear function in fagg(c), and its differential
∂fagg(c)Ψ(c, fagg(c)) is a step function in fagg(c). We now introduce the following result to further
transform the destination’s problem:
Lemma 4. The destination’s problem in (39) leads to the same minimal objective value as the
following problem:
min
fagg(·)
J(fagg) , Ec
[
G
(
1
fagg(c)
)
fagg(c) + Ψ(c, fagg(c))
]
(42a)
s.t. fagg(c) ∈
[
0,
∑
i∈I
fi,max
]
, ∀c ∈ C. (42b)
We present the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix D. Lemma 4 transforms the vector functional
optimization problem in (39) into a scalar functional optimization problem in (42). Therefore,
after obtaining the optimal solution f ∗agg(·), we can then solve the problem in (41) to obtain the
original solution to the problem in (39).
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the optimal solutions to the problems in (42) and (39).
We observe that the problem in (42) now becomes similar to the problem in Lemma 3 in the
single-source case, with the following difference: Φ(c, fagg(c)) is not differentiable in fagg(c)).
Hence, it follows that the optimality condition of (42) can be rewritten as
g
(
1
fagg(c)
)
1
fagg(c)
−G
(
1
fagg(c)
)
∈ ∂Ψ(c, fagg(c)), ∀c ∈ C, (43)
i.e., the marginal AoI cost reduction is equal to a subgradient of the aggregate virtual cost.
To understand (43), we first introduce the order indexing (i) such that
φ(1)(c(1)) ≤ φ(2)(c(2)) ≤ ... ≤ φ(i)(c(i)) ≤ ... ≤ φ(I)(c(I)), (44)
i.e., source (i) has the i-th smallest virtual cost φ(i)(c(i)).
We present an illustrative example of (43) in Fig. 2 for a given c. As we have mentioned, the
differential of the aggregate virtual cost in fagg(c) corresponds to a step function, as shown in
Fig. 2. The intersection point between the subgradient and the curve of the marginal AoI cost
reduction corresponds to the solution to (43).
Based on the order index in (44) and the solution in (43), we are ready to present the solution
to (39):
Theorem 4. If the sources’ virtual costs φi(ci) are non-decreasing, the optimal mechanism
m∗ = (f ∗,h∗) satisfies (36), (37), and
f ∗(i)(c) =
[
f ∗agg(c)−
i−1∑
j=1
f ∗(j)(c)
]f(i),max
0
,∀c ∈ C,∀i ∈ I. (45)
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Illustration of the optimal mechanism (f∗, h∗) and the corresponding quantized mechanism (fq, hq) for a single-source
system.
We present the proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix E. Intuitively, after obtaining the optimal
aggregate update rate f ∗agg(·), the problem is reduced to solve (42). Each source (i)’s allocated
update rate f ∗(i)(·) is then the residual aggregate update rate (the aggregate update rate subtracted
from assigned update rates to the first (i− 1) sources) projected onto its feasible set [0, f(i),max].
We will generalize Theorem 4 to the more general (potentially not monotonic) virtual cost
case in Section VII, and design a computation-efficient approximation of the optimal mechanism
m∗ = (f ∗,h∗) in Section VI.
VI. QUANTIZED OPTIMAL MECHANISM
We note that the optimal mechanisms (for both single-source systems and multi-source sys-
tems) may be computationally impractical, since the optimal payment rate rules h∗(c) for the
optimal mechanisms in (23) and (36) involve integrating f ∗(c) and hence require explicitly
solving f ∗(c) in (33) for all c.
Therefore, in this section, we are motivated to design a computation-efficient quantized mecha-
nism, which achieves approximate optimality while maintains the optimal mechanism’s economic
properties.
A. Quantized Mechanism
We introduce the quantized mechanism in the following:
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Definition 7 (Quantized Mechanism). The quantized mechanism mq = (f q,hq) is
f qi (c) = f
∗
i
(
∆Q ·
(
b ci
∆Q
c+ 1
2
)
, c−i
)
, ∀i ∈ I, (46a)
hqi (c) = ci · f qi (c) +
∫ c¯i
ci
f qi (z, c−i)dz, ∀i ∈ I, (46b)
where b·c depicts the floor operator and ∆Q is the quantization step size.
We illustrate the optimal mechanism and the corresponding quantized mechanism in Fig. 3. As
shown in Fig. 3, the integral in (46b) is a Riemann sum, i.e., a computation-efficient finite sum
approximation of
∫ c¯i
ci
f ∗i (z, c−i)dz. Specifically, given a quantization step size ∆Q, computing
the Riemann sum in (46b) requires to compute f ∗i (ci, c−i) for at most d c¯i−ci∆Q e points, for each
source i. Therefore, the overall computation overhead is given by O(I/∆Q).
B. Properties of the Quantized Mechanism
In this subsection, we study the properties of the quantized mechanism in (46). We note that
f qi (ci, c−i) remains non-increasing in ci for all i ∈ I. Hence, based on the characterizations of
the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality in Theorem 3 and (37), we have:
Corollary 1. The quantized mechanism in mq satisfies the incentive compatibility and the
individual rationality conditions in (9) and (10).
We next study the performance of the qunatized mechanism in (46) in terms of the destination’s
overall cost. To understand how well the quantized mechanism in (46) approximates the optimal
mechanism, we leverage the envelope theorem in [42] to derive the following lemma:
Lemma 5. The aggregate virtual cost function in Definition 6 is differentiable in c and satisfies
∂Ψ(c, fagg(c))
∂ci
= φ′i(ci)f
∗
i ≤ Li,φfi,max,∀ci ∈ Ci,∀i ∈ I, (47)
where Li,φ is the Lipschitz constant of φi(ci).
Lemma 5 is a direct application of the envelop theorem in [42]. When the PDF of the source
i’s sampling cost γi(ci) is differentiable, it follows that
Li,φ , max
ci∈Ci
[
2− Γi(ci)γ
′
i(ci)
γ2i (ci)
]
, ∀ci ∈ Ci, ∀i ∈ I. (48)
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Fig. 4: Impact of the quantization step size ∆Q on the quantization loss (i.e., the difference of the source’s overall costs between
the quantized mechanism and the optimal mechanism) under different distributions of the source’s sampling cost.
Lemma 5 characterizes the upper bound of the incremental changes of the aggregate virtual
cost Φ(c, fagg(c)) in ci, based on which we can now show that the quantized mechanism is
approximately optimal:
Proposition 1. The quantized mechanism leads to a bounded quantization loss, compared against
the optimal mechanism, given by
J(f q)− J(f ∗) ≤
∑
i∈I
Li,φfi,max∆Q. (49)
We present the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix F. That is, the quantization loss depends
on the quantization step size ∆Q. Therefore, the quantized mechanism enable to make tradeoffs
between the quantization loss captured by Proposition 1 and the computation overheadsO(1/∆Q)
by tuning ∆Q.
C. Numerical Studies
We perform numerical studies in Fig. 4 to understand the impact of the quantization step size
∆Q on the quantization loss in a single-source system. We consider two classes of distributions
of the source’s sampling cost.
1) Uniform Distribution: We first consider the uniform distribution over the interval [5, 30],
the corresponding Lipschitz constant to which is Lφ = 2. Fig. 4(a) shows that, when ∆Q is close
to 0, the quantization only incurs negligible loss, which verifies Lemma 5. In addition, as ∆Q,
the quantization loss grows slowly.
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2) Truncated Exponential Distribution: We consider the truncated exponential distribution
over the interval [0, 30] with a PDF:
γ(c) =
exp(−c)
1− exp(−c¯) . (50)
The corresponding Lipschitz constant to which is Lφ = 1 + exp(c¯). Fig. 4(b) shows that, the
quantization only incurs a negligible loss when ∆Q is close to 0. However, the quantization loss
grows rapidly as ∆Q increases, due to the large Lφ.
VII. GENERAL VIRTUAL COST FUNCTION
The results in Theorems 2 and 4 require non-decreasing virtual cost functions φi(ci). In this
section, we extend our results to the more general case in which φi(ci) may not be always non-
decreasing. We first introduce the Ironing technique [22] and start with the following definitions:
Definition 8 (Convex Hull). The convex hull of a function h(x) : X → R is defined as
h˜(x) , min {λh(x1) + (1− λ)h(x2)|λ ∈ [0, 1], x1, x2 ∈ R and λx1 + (1− λ)x2 = x} . (51)
Definition 9 (Ironed Virtual Cost). Define the cumulative virtual cost as Φi(ci) =
∫ ci
ci
φi(t)γi(t)dt.
Let Φ˜i(ci) be the convex hull of Φi(ci). Let [ai,1, bi,1], ..., [ai,k, bi,k] be the intervals such that
Φ˜i(ci) < Φi(ci). Each source i’s ironed virtual cost is
φ˜i(ci) ,

∫ bi,k
ai,k
φi(t)γi(t)dt
Γ(bi,k)−Γ(ai,k) , if ci ∈ [ai,k, bi,k],
φi(ci), otherwise.
(52)
To understand Definitions 8 and 9, we present an illustrative example in Fig. 5 of the
cumulative virtual cost Φi(ci), its convex hull Φ˜i(ci), and the ironed virtual cost φ˜i(ci). In Fig.
5(a), the convex hull Φ˜i(ci) straightened out the region [ai,1, bi,1]. Fig. 5(b) shows that the ironed
virtual cost φ˜i(ci) is constant over the straightened region [ai,1, bi,1], hence the ironed virtual cost
φ˜i(ci) is always non-decreasing in ci.
We define an ironed version of the aggregate virtual cost:
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Fig. 5: Illustration of the convex hull of the cumulative virtual cost Φ˜i(ci) (a) and the ironed virtual cost φ˜i(ci) (b).
Definition 10 (Ironed Aggregate Virtual Cost). Let Ψ˜(c, fagg(c)) be the aggregate virtual cost
function, defined as
Ψ˜(c, fagg(c)) , min
f
∑
i∈I
φ˜i(ci)fi(c) (53a)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi(c) = fagg(c), (53b)
fi(c) ∈ [0, fi,max], ∀i ∈ I. (53c)
We are ready to show that, replacing Ψi(c) by Ψ˜i(c) in (43) leads to the following:
Theorem 5. For any general virtual cost function φi(ci), the optimal solution f ∗(·) to the
problem in (25) satisfies
f ∗(i)(c) =
[
f ironagg (c)−
i−1∑
j=1
f ∗(j)(c)
]f(i),max
0
, ∀i ∈ I, (54)
where f ironagg (c) satisfies
g
(
1
f ironagg (c)
)
1
f ironagg (c)
−G
(
1
f ironagg (c)
)
∈ ∂Ψ˜(c, f ironagg (c)), ∀c ∈ C. (55)
Intuitively, since the ironed virtual costs are non-increasing, the resultant f ∗i (ci, c−i) in (54) is
non-decreasing in ci for all i ∈ I, which ensures (9) and (10) even when relaxing the f ′i(c) > 0
constraints in (39). We present the complete proof of Theorem 5 in Appendix E.
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VIII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we present analytical and numerical studies to understand when the optimal
mechanism in Theorem 4 and the quantized mechanism in (46) are most beneficial, and the
impacts of system parameters on the proposed mechanisms.
A. Benchmarks
For performance comparison, we introduce a benchmark mechanism and a lower bound
achieved by a pricing scheme assuming complete information.
We define the benchmark mechanism as follows and will show such a mechanism satisfies
the constraints in (9) and (10):
Definition 11 (Benchmark Mechanism). The destination only selects the destination with the
least reported sampling cost and subsidizes it with the second smallest (reported) sampling cost;
the update policy rule fB(c˜) is to minimize the destination’s overall cost in (8), based on .
fi,B(c) =
arg minfi∈[0,fi,max]
[
fiG
(
1
fi
)
− fic(2)
]
, if i = arg min cj,
0, otherwise.
(56a)
hi,B(c) =fi(c)c(2), ∀i ∈ I, (56b)
where c(2) is the second smallest sampling cost, is set to be c¯ when there is only one source.
Note that the benchmark mechanism satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (9) and
the individual rationality constraint in (10) This is because, for the source with the smallest
sampling cost, it cannot achieve a higher payoff than truthful reporting, as (56a) and (56b) only
depend on the second smallest report.
We next introduce a lower bound achieved by a pricing scheme assuming complete informa-
tion:
Definition 12 (Complete-Information Pricing Scheme). Under the complete information setting,
the source subsidizes each source their exact sampling costs; the update policy rule f aims at
minimizes its long-term average AoI cost and the long-term average payments. Mathematically,
fF (c) = arg min
f(·)∈F
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I fi(c)
)∑
i∈I
fi(c) +
∑
i∈I
ci · fi(c)
]
, (57a)
hi,F (c) = fi,F (c)ci, ∀i ∈ I. (57b)
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Fig. 6: Performance comparison under the uniform distribution with different upper bounds of the sampling cost c¯ in (a), (b)
and with different age sensitivity coefficients α in (c). We set the quantization step size to be ∆Q = 1. We set α = 1 in (a)
and (b) and c¯ = 30 in (c).
Such a pricing scheme leads to a lower bound of the destination’s overall cost. Due to
the assumption of complete information, this pricing scheme does not satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint (9), while it achieves the individual rationality constraint in (10).
B. Single-Source Systems
For the single-source systems, we consider both a uniform distribution and a truncated expo-
nential distribution of the sources’ sampling costs.4 We aim to understand when the proposed
mechanism are most beneficial, compared against the benchmark mechanism.
1) Uniform Distribution: We first compare the performance under a uniform distribution of
the sampling cost on the interval [c, c¯]. The benchmark mechanism leads to an overall cost of
the destination of
JB =
[
c¯
(
1 +
1
α
)] α
1+α
. (58)
The lower bound of the overall cost under complete information is given:
JC =
c¯
1+2α
1+α − c 1+2α1+α
c¯− c
1 + α
1 + 2α
(
1 +
1
α
) α
1+α
. (59)
We have
JB
JC
=
(
1 +
α
1 + α
)[
(c¯− c)c¯ α1+α
c¯
1+2α
1+α − c 1+2α1+α
]
≤ 1 + α
1 + α
, (60)
indicating that, under the uniform distribution, the benchmark mechanism incurs a bounded loss
due to private information.
4These two distributions of costs are also considered in [41].
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On the other hand, the optimal mechanism in Theorem 2 leads to an overall cost of
J∗ =
[
2
(
1 +
1
α
)] α
1+α
(
1 + α
1 + 2α
) {(c− c
2
)
1+2α
1+α
} ∣∣∣c¯
c
c¯− c . (61)
It then follows that
J∗
JC
=
{
(c− c
2
)
1+2α
1+α
} ∣∣∣c¯
c
c¯
1+2α
1+α − c 1+2α1+α
2
α
1+α ≤ 2 α1+α . (62)
Equations (60) and (62) imply that, under the uniform distribution, the performance gain of the
optimal mechanism compared to the benchmark mechanism is limited.
In Fig. 6, we numerically the performances of the proposed optimal mechanism, the benchmark
mechanism, and the complete information lower bound. We observe a relatively small gap
between the proposed optimal mechanism and the benchmark mechanism in Fig. 6(a). In Fig.
6(b), both the proposed optimal mechanism and the benchmark mechanism approach their upper
bounds in (60) and (62). In addition, the curve of the quantized mechanism overlaps with that
of the optimal mechanism, which implies that the quantization of the optimal mechanism incurs
negligible quantization loss under the uniform distribution.
2) Truncated Exponential Distribution: In this subsection, we consider an exponential dis-
tribution of the sampling cost truncated on the interval [0, c¯], i.e., assuming c = 0. The corre-
sponding PDF is
γ(c) =
µ exp(−µc)
1− exp(−µc¯) , (63)
and we fix µ = 1. Note that the performance of the benchmark mechanism only depends on c¯
instead of the specific distribution of c. Hence, the overall cost is the same as in (58). The lower
bound of the overall cost under complete information is:
JC =
(1 + 1
α
)
α
1+α
1− e−c¯
[
Γ
(
2α
1 + α
+
1
α
, 0
)
− Γ
(
2α + 1
1 + α
, c¯
)]
, (64)
where Γ(s, x) =
∫ ∞
x
ts−1 exp(−t) dt is the incomplete gamma Function. Note that (64) con-
verges to a finite value when c¯→∞.
The optimal mechanism leads to an overall cost:
J∗ =
(1 + 1
α
)
α
1+α
1− e−c¯
∫ c¯
0
(t− 1 + exp(t)) a1+a exp(−t)dt. (65)
Fig. 7(a) shows that overall costs of the destination under the optimal mechanism and the
complete information lower bound converge as c¯ increases. The benchmark mechanism in this
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Fig. 7: Performance comparison under the truncated exponential distribution with different upper bounds of the sampling cost
c¯ in (a), (b) and with different age sensitivity coefficients α in (a), (c). We set the quantization step size to be ∆Q = 1. In (a)
and (b), we set α = 1. In (c), we set c¯ = 30.
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Fig. 8: Performance comparison with different upper bounds of the sampling cost c¯ in (a), different number of sources I in (b),
and different distribution parameter µ in (c). We set the quantization step size to be ∆Q = 0.5 and consider a linear AoI cost:
f(∆t) = ∆t. In (a) and (b), µ1 = 0.5 and µi = 2 for all i 6= 1. In (a) and (c), we set I = 4. In (b) and (c), we set c¯ = 20.
case leads to an unbounded overall cost as c¯ increases. In Fig. 7(b), we observe relatively
small gaps between the optimal mechanism and the complete information lower bound, and
between the optimal mechanism and the quantized mechanism. In particular, we have J∗/JC ≈ 2
when c¯ ≥ 10. Therefore, we have shown that under the truncated exponential distribution,
both proposed mechanisms can lead to unbounded benefits, compared against the benchmark
mechanism. Fig. 7(c) shows that the proposed optimal mechanism becomes more beneficial
when the destination is more sensitive to the AoI, compared with the benchmark mechanism.
C. Multi-Source Systems
We next perform numerical studies to evaluate the impacts of system parameters on the
performances under the multi-source systems.
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We assume exponential distributions for all sources truncated on the interval Ci = Cj = [0, c¯],
i.e., the PDF of the sampling cost for each source i is
γi(ci) =
µi exp(−µici)
1− exp(−µic¯i) , ∀i ∈ I. (66)
1) Impacts of the c¯: Fig. 8(a) shows that overall costs of the destination under the optimal
mechanism and the complete information lower bound increase as c¯ increases. However, the gap
between the optimal mechanism and the benchmark is smaller, compared to the gap in (7)(a).
Intuitively, the increasing number of sources introduce competition, which renders incentivizing
truthful report less costly for the benchmark mechanism and hence makes the performance gap
smaller.
2) Impacts of the Number of Sources I: In the second experiment for multi-source systems,
we set µ1 = 0.5 and µi = 2 for all i 6= 1. Fig. 8(b) studies the impacts of the the number of
sources I on the performances of the benchmarks and the optimal mechanism. Fig. 8(b) shows
that, as I increases, the performances of the complete information lower bound, the optimal
mechanism, and the quantized mechanism only slightly decrease, while that of the benchmark
mechanism dramatically decreases. As we mentioned, this is because the competition due to
increasing number of sources introduce makes the benchmark less costly to induce truthful
reports. Hence, when there are many sources I , the benchmark mechanism may serve as a
close-to-optimal solution.
3) Impacts of µ: In our last experiment, we set I = 4, µ1 = 0.5, and µi = µ for all i 6= 1
and study the impacts of the parameter µ. A larger µ indicates that the sources other than i
have larger expected sampling costs compared to source i, hence sources are considered more
heterogeneous. Fig. 8(c) shows that, as µ increases, the performance gaps between the benchmark
mechanism and the optimal mechanism and the proposed mechanisms become larger. On the
other hand, when µ = 0.5, the optimal mechanism only slightly outperforms the benchmark
mechanism. Therefore, heterogeneity in sources’ sampling costs increases performance gaps
between proposed mechanisms and the benchmark mechanism.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the fresh information acquisition problem in the presence of private infor-
mation. We have designed the optimal mechanism to minimize the destination’s AoI cost and
its payment to the source, while satisfying the truthful reporting and individual rationality con-
straints. We have further designed the quantized mechanism to make tradeoffs between optimality
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and computational complexity. Our analysis revealed that the proposed optimal mechanism may
lead to an unbounded benefit, compared against a benchmark mechanism, though this gain
depends on the distribution of the sampling cost. Our numerical results further show that the
optimal mechanism is most beneficial when there are few sources with heterogeneous sampling
costs.
There are a few future directions. The first future direction is to design the prior-free mech-
anism design for the systems in which the sources and destinations do not have distributional
information. Second, we will consider the real-time systems in which data sources are also
requestors as in some practical systems, e.g., Google Waze [3] and GasBuddy [4].
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We define
x¯(c˜,m) = lim sup
K→∞
∑K
k=1 xk(c˜)
K
, (67)
as the long-term average interarrival time,
p¯ii(c˜,m) = lim inf
K→∞
∑K
k=1 si,k(c˜)
K
, (68)
as the long-term average frequency for source i, and
p¯i(c˜,m) =
limK→∞
∑K
k=1 si,k(c˜)pi,k(c˜)
K
p¯ii(c˜,m)
, (69)
as the long-term average payment for source i.
Let m∗ = (P∗,X ∗,S∗) be an arbitrary optimal mechanism. Consider another mechanism
m′ = (P ′,X ′,S ′) such that, for all i ∈ I,
p′i,k(c) = p¯i(c,m
∗) and x′k(c) = x¯(c,m
∗) ,∀k ∈ N, (70)
and s′i,k(·) is generated according to an i.i.d. distribution across k such that
Pr(si,k(c˜) = 1) = p¯ii(c˜,m
∗), ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ N, (71)
Hence, the new mechanism m′ is equal-spacing and flat-rate, and its schedulign policy is
stationary. It follows that, x¯(c˜,m∗) = x¯(c˜,m′), p¯ii(c˜,m∗) = p¯ii(c˜,m′), and p¯i(c˜,m∗) = p¯i(c˜,m′)
for all i ∈ I. Under the optimal mechanism m∗, each source i’s expected payoff satisfies
Ec−i [Pi (c˜i, c−i|m∗, ci)]] =Ec−i
[
lim inf
K→∞
∑K
k=1 s
∗
i,k(c˜)(p¯i,k(c˜)− ci)∑K
k=1 x
∗
k(c˜)
]
, ∀i ∈ I
=Ec−i
[
p¯ii(c˜,m
∗)(p¯i(c˜,m∗)− ci)
x¯(c˜,m∗)
]
, ∀i ∈ I
=Ec−i
[
p¯ii(c˜,m
′)(p¯i(c˜,m′)− ci)
x¯(c˜,m′)
]
, ∀i ∈ I
=Ec−i [Pi (c˜i, c−i|m′, ci)]] , ∀i ∈ I. (72)
From (72), we observe that, if m∗ is incentive compatible and individually rational, then m′ is
also incentive compatible and individually rational. Hence, for all i ∈ I,
ci ∈ arg max
c˜i∈Ci
Ec−i [Pi (c˜i, c−i|m′, ci)],
max
c˜i∈Ci
Ec−i [Pi (c˜i, c−i|m′, ci)] ≥ 0. (73)
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Finally, we have that the destination’s ex ante long-term overall cost satisfies
J(m′) = Ec
[
G(x¯(c,m′)) +
∑
i∈I p¯ii(c,m
′)p¯i(c,m′)
x¯(c,m′)
]
= Ec
[
G(x¯(c,m′)) +
∑
i∈I p¯ii(c,m
∗)p¯i(c,m∗)
x¯(c,m∗)
]
(a)
≤ Ec
[
limK→∞
∑K
k=1G(xk(c,m
∗))/K +
∑
i∈I p¯ii(c,m
∗)p¯i(c,m∗)
x¯(c,m∗)
]
= J(m∗), (74)
where (a) is due to the convexity of G(·) and Jensen’s inequality. We complete the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 3
We prove Theorem 3 directly, which is a more general result than Theorem 1.
When all sources other than i are truthfully reporting, each source i’s expected payoff is
Ec−i [Pi(c˜i, c˜−i|m, ci)]. For presentation simplicity, we replace Ec−i [Pi(c˜i, c˜−i|m, ci)] by Pi(c˜i|ci),
Ec−i [fi(c˜i, c−i)] by fi(c˜i), and Ec−i [hi(c˜i, c−i)] by hi(c˜i) in this proof.
We first prove the “if” direction and that prove the “only if” direction. The source’s payoff is
Pi(c˜i|ci) = c˜i · fi(c˜i)−
∫ c˜i
ci
fi(z)dz + C − fi(c˜i) · ci, ∀i ∈ I. (75)
Taking the derivative of (75) with respect to c˜ yields:
∂Pi(c˜i|ci)
∂c˜i
= (ci − c˜i)f ′i(c˜i), ∀i ∈ I. (76)
Combining (76) and the fact that ∂Pi(c˜i|ci)
∂c˜i
≤ 0 (≥ 0) for all c˜i ≥ ci (c˜i ≤ ci). This shows that
Pi(c˜i, ci) is maximized at c˜i = ci. We completed the first half of the proof.
We next prove the “only if” direction. To prove the condition 1) is necessary, let z1 and z2
be arbitrary costs satisfying z1 ≤ z2. An incentive compatible m requires:
Pi(z1|z2) = hi(z1)− fi(z1)z2 ≤ hi(z2)− fi(z2)z2 = Pi(z2|z2), (77)
Pi(z2|z1) = hi(z2)− fi(z2)z1 ≤ hi(z1)− fi(z1)z1 = Pi(z1|z1). (78)
Combining (77) and (78), we have (fi(z1) − fi(z2))(z1 − z2) ≤ 0. Because z1 ≤ z2, we have
fi(z1) ≥ fi(z2). Therefore, fi(ci) is non-increasing for all i ∈ I.
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To prove condition 2) is necessary, we consider the first order optimality condition of the
source’s report c˜∗i :
h′i(c˜
∗
i ) = ci · f ′i(c˜∗i ), ∀i ∈ I. (79)
A mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if
h′i(ci) = ci · f ′i(ci), ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀i ∈ I. (80)
Taking integrals of both sides of (80) yields∫ ci
ci
h′i(z)dz =
∫ ci
ci
z · f ′i(z)dz
=⇒ hi(ci)− hi(c˜i) = c · fi(ci)|cici −
∫ ci
ci
fi(z)dz, ∀i ∈ I. (81)
We complete the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Corollary 2. If φ(c) is non-decreasing, the destination’s minimal overall cost (attained by the
optimal mechanism) is given by
J(f ∗) = Ec
[
g
(
1
f ∗(c)
)]
. (82)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
After relaxing the f ′i(c) ≤ 0 constraints and introducing the new decision fagg(·), the problem
in (39) becomes
min
f(·),fagg(·)
J(f) , Ec
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I fi(c)
)∑
i∈I
fi(c) +
∑
i∈I
φi(ci)fi(c)
]
(83)
s.t. f(·) ∈ F , {f(·) : fi(c) ∈ [0, fi,max], f ′i(c) ≤ 0, ∀c ∈ C, i ∈ I} (84)∑
i∈I
fi(c) = fagg(c), ∀i ∈ I. (85)
which is equivalent to Lemma 4. We complete the proof.
34
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The destination’s overall cost can be rewritten as
J(f) =
∫
C
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I fi(c)
)∑
i∈I
fi(c) +
∑
i∈I
fi(c)φi(ci)
]
dΓ(c)
=
∫
C
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I fi(c)
)∑
i∈I
fi(c) +
∑
i∈I
fi(c)φ˜i(ci)
]
dΓ(c)
+
∫
C
[∑
i∈I
fi(c)[φi(ci)− φ˜i(ci)]
]
dΓ(c). (86)
Let f ?(·) be the minimizer of
f ?(·) = arg min
f(·)∈F
Ec
[
G
(∑
i∈I
fi(c)
)∑
i∈I
fi(c) +
∑
i∈I
fi(c)φ˜i(ci)
]
.
It follows that
Ec
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I f
∗
i (c)
)∑
i∈I
f ∗i (c) +
∑
i∈I
f ∗i (c)φ˜i(ci)
]
≥Ec
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I fi(c)
)∑
i∈I
fi(c) +
∑
i∈I
fi(c)φ˜i(ci)
]
, ∀f(·) ∈ F . (87)
Since Φ˜i(·) is the convex hull of Φi(·), if Φi(ci) > Φ˜i(ci) in (ak, bk) then φ˜′i(ci) = 0. It follows
that f ?i (c) is constant at (ak, bk). Therefore, we have∫ bki
aki
[
G
(
1∑
i∈I f
?
i (c)
)
f ?i (c) + f
?
i (c)φ(c)−G
(
1∑
i∈I f
?
i (c)
)
f ?i (c) +
∑
i∈I
f ?i (c)φ˜i(ci)
]
γ(ci)dci
=
∑
i∈I
∫
C−i
∫ bki
aki
f ?i (c)
[
φi(ci)− φ˜i(ci)
]
γi(ci)γ−i(c−i)dc
(a)
= 0, (88)
where (a) follows directly from the definition of φ˜i(·) in (52).
Combining (86), (87), and (88), we have that J(f) ≤ J(f ?) for every f . Therefore, f ? is the
optimal solution to the problem in (25).
